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GEAN C. SUMMERS, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
LYNN OWEN NEWTON, and ALEEN 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to foreclose a public welfare 
'.ien on property located in Juab County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried by the court and judgment 
was in favor of the plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the trial court's 
iudgment be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent will accept the appellant's 
statement of facts, except that Ruben Edward Carter 
received public assistance from August 1955 to 
August 1957, and during this period his wife, Rubv 
Carter, also was a recipient of public assistance. J~ 
addition, Ruby Carter received public assistance in 
Juab County from September 1957 to June 1958 and 
filed an application in Utah County and received 
public assistance from Utah County from July 1958 
to July 1959. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT THE ACTION WAS NOT BARRED BY UTAH 
CODE ANN.§ 78-12-27(4) (1953). 
There are many errors in the citations to the 
statutes in the appellant's brief. The Public Welfare 
lien liability was originally covered by Utah Laws 
1947, ch. 89, § 5, but this section was amended effec· 
tive April 1, 1953. Utah Laws 1953, ch. 90 § 2. The 
quotation of the applicc_ble law on July 21, 1955 
when the lien was signed in this case, as shown on 
page 12, is not correct since the provision there 
quoted is the unamended version of that statute. The 
correct citation of the law in effect on July 21, 1955. 
is Utah Laws, 1953, ch. 90, ~ 2. As far as this proceed 
ing is concerned, the provisions of the 1953 law are 
practically identical with the provisions of Utah 
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Code Ann. § 55-15-30 0961), effective on May 10, 
]961, and for all practical purposes this section 
which is quoted beginning on page 6 of the appel-
1 
!ant's brief will apply to all material matters 
herein. On page .5 of his brief, a p p e 11 ant 
has erroneously referred to Utah Laws 1957, ch. 126, 
! 30 ad then refers to Utah Code Ann. § 55-15-30 
(1953). Utah Laws 1961. ch. 126, § 30 is actually the 
same as Utah Code Ann. § 55-15-30. In other words, 
!here was only one change in the law during the 
period involved in this case and that was in 1961 
when the Public Assistance Act of 1961, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 55-15-1 to -39 (1963), was enacted. 
One important distinction between the version 
erroneously quoted on page 4 of the Appellant's 
brief, and the 1953 amendment is that the quoted 
I version, in part, provided "foreclosure of the lien 
shall not be sought until the death of the recipient 
when said recipient is the sole owner of the prop-
erty or until the death of both husband and wife 
vrhen the property is held as joint tenants with full 
rights of survivorship," Utah Laws 1947, ch. 89, § 5, 
iemphasis added), whereas the amendment provides 
!hat foreclosure shall be taken "upon the death of 
lhe recipient and his or her spouse, if any." Utah 
. Laws 1953, ch. 90, § 2, at 250. 
I The argument of appellant is that the public 
I welfare lien agreement executed by both of the 
I Carters is only evidence of the lien as created by 
statute, and that it was mandatory for the respondent 
iO seek collection of the lien either upon the death 
)f Ruben Edward Carter on August 20, 1957, or in 
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any event, on the recording of the deed from th2 
Carters to the appellant on August 23, 1957, uncle: 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 55-l 5-30(b) (l/ 
(1953). The appellant then concludes that all liability 
under the lien agreement is created by statute am 
that any action thereon is governed by the thres 
year period of limitations under Utah Code Ann. 1 
78-12-26(4) (1953) and that the action was barred since 
the deed was recorded on August 23, 1957, and th'2 
action was not commenced until January 23, 1962. 
Appellant takes the position that it was manda 
tory for the department to commence foreclosure 
when the deed from the recipients was recorded. 
This cannot be a valid argument as Ruby Carter 
continued to receive welfare assistance in Juab 
County until June 1958, when she then made appl-
cation to the Utah County Department of Public 
Welfare and received assistance under the lier: 
from that time until July 1959. Assuming that the ap 
plicable statute of limitation is three years, and the! 
the statute would begin to run either on the last da:e 
when Ruby received public assistance or on the 
date of her death on September 12, 1961, the con> 
plaint was still filed in time on January 23, 1962. Tc 
hold that the statute began to run when the deed 
was recorded when Ruby Carter continued to re 
ceive assistance would be inequitable, and the w 
pellants are estopped to assert the statute of limita 
tions in such circumstances. See Neff v. New York 
Life Ins. Co., 180 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1947) where it was 
held that a party, by reason of the fraudulent cor: 
cealment of the fact upon which the existence of e: 
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cause of action depends, may be estopped to set up 
the defense of the statute of limitation. See also 
McLearn v. Hill, 177 N. W. 617 (Mass. 1931), which 
holds that estoppel to set up the defense of limita-
tions may rest on necessary implication. Also to be 
considered in this case, is the general rules that if 
there is doubt as to which of two statutes of limita· 
tions applies the longer rather than the shorter pe-
riod of limitation is to be preferred and is generally 
api:: lied. See Payne v. Ostrus, 50 F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 
1931); Southern Pac. R. R. v. Gonzales, 61 P.2d 377 
(Ariz. 1936). 
In support of the creation of the liability by 
statute, appellant cites 81 C.J.S. Social Security and 
Public Welfare § 31 at 69 for the general statement 
that "it is only pursuant to statutory provisions that 
the authorities may have a lien for assistance fur-
nished." As authority for this editorial comment the 
case of Camden County Welfare v. Federal Deposit 
Ins. Corp., 63 A. 2d 417 (N. J. 1948) is cited. This case 
considered only the type of lien created by an 
agreement to reimburse the county for assistance 
received, and the question of the statute of limita-
tions was not involved in the case but only the 
question of priority of liens. Appellant further cites 
the case of County Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Potthoff, 
44 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. 1942). This case is concerned 
with the effect of an act repealing provisions of the 
St:J.te Welfare Act relating to granting a lien against 
Property of old age assist'lnce recipients and is not 
in point on this appeal. 
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Respondent appears to rely entirely on the ca22 I 
of Utah Poultry and Farmers Co-op. v. Utah Ice and I 
Storage Co., 187 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1951) for the pro;, j 
osition that the welfare lien agreement is coveredb·; 
the three years period of limitations as a liability ere- ! 
ated by statute. The quotation from this case begin I 
ning on Page 14 of appellant's brief is actually the j 
editorial summary of the decision in A.L.R.2d (see 2! l-
A.L.R.2d 1461) and does not state the opinion of the 
court as its affects our question. The case did nc! ~ 
concern itself with the statute of limitation as to lia 
bilities created by statute, but was concerned with 
the question of whether a warehouse receipt issued 
under the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, Utah 
Laws 1917, § 201 constitutes a contract under the limi-
tation for an action upon any contract, obligation or 
liability founded upon an instrument in writing m 
whether an action for injury to personal property 
resulting from a breach of the storage contract came 
under the limitations for actions for taking, detain 
ing, or injuring personal property under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-26(2) (1953). The court did not hold tha: 
the warehouse receipt was a liability created by 
statute under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3). It wi!l 
be noted also that the warehouse receipt specificallv 
limited liability to the "diligence and care required 
by law," and the court said, 187 F.2d at 654: 
But, contrary to the contentions of appellant, the 
warehouse receipt pleaded here, did not create am 
duty beyond the legal duty imposed by statute. 
Rather, it specifically provides that the liability o! 
the appellee under the storage contract is limited to 
the "diligence and care required by law". 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
I It is also important to consider that the decision 
I .n the Utah Poultry case indicates that the statute of 
I 
limitations and the liability of the warehousemen 
would have been the same if no warehouse receipt 
nad been issued. In other words, the warehouse-i ~en'~ a~t i~ s~lf executing, and the ware~ousemen's 
j 1iab1hty is limited by statute unless there is an agree-
!
. ment for any further liability. In the instant case, 
however, the welfare lien law involved is not self 
executing and Utah Laws 1953, ch. 90, § 5 specifical-
' !y, in part, provides: 
Effective as of July 1, 1947, all old age assistance 
recipients and all those subsequently applying for 
assistance who are not exempt as hereinbefore pro-
vided, shall be required to enter into agreements to 
reimburse as hereinabove provided as a condition 
precedent to receiving any assistance under this act. 
The instrument is designated as an "agree-
ment" in the statute and the instrument executed by 
the recipients is designated as "Public Welfare 
Lien Agreement" (Exhibit P-1). Both applicable 
statutes also provide that the recording of said lien 
agreement shall have the same effect as a lien by 
JUdgment, and that ri.11 such real property, including 
but not limited to joint tenancy interest, shall from 
'.he time of recording of such agreement be and be-
come charged with a lien for all assistance received 
by the recipient or his or her spouse or dependents. 
Therefore, this is an action upon a contract, obliga-
tion or liability founded upon an instrument in writ-
ing and is governed by the six year limitation under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (1953). It is also pointed 
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out, that our statutes set forth the effect of a warrant'. 
deed and a mortgage in statutory form, and it woulc 
not be contended that a warranty deed or mortgage 
is not a contract based upon an instrument in writ! 
ing. Likewise, it cannot be contended that a welfare! 
lien agreement is simply evidence of the obligatior! 
and liability fixed by statute as in the case of the 
warehouse receipt ]n the Utah Poultry case. There 
is no liability under a warranty deed and a mon 
gage until it is executed, and there is no liabillli 
under the welfare lien statute until an agreement ii 
executed. By the great weight of authority a liabilli: 
created by statute is one which the law creates ~I 
the absence of an agreement and which would nc 
exist but for the statute. See Baldwin v. Fenimore, 
149 Kan. 825, 89 P.2d 883 (1939). 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THA1 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAI 
RECIPIENTS RECEIVED ASSISTANCE FROM TH! 
JUAB COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE 
WHICH WAS SUBJECT TO INTEREST, AS ALLOWEi 
IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT. 
The appellant contends that no funds were pait 
out by the Juab County Department of Public We 
fare except as were paid out of Federal and Sta! 
funds. The fact remains that the lien agreemer 
itself (Exhibit P-1) recites as follows: 
I, or we, the undersi.gned, having applied for pub 
assistance from the Juab County Department of Pul 
lie Welfare and in order to secure the reimbursem 
of any sums advanced to me, or us, or paid in my, 
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our behalf by the said county welfare department, do 
hereby grant and lien .... 
1 
In the case of Boone County Old Age Assistance 
!ii Bd. v. Myhre, 149 Neb. 669, 32 N.W. 2d 262 (1948). 
e which was an action for collection of a welfare lien 
f'i 
, by the county treasurer, the court held that the 
, county treasurer was the real party in interest even 
; though any recovery would be paid to the State and 
:. Federal Governments who were not parties to the 
ii action, citing 42 U.S.C.A. 3 303. 
r As to the question of sufficiency of the evidence 
,I as to the amount paid, there can be little question 
,, that the evidence is sufficient to support the pay-
!, ment of $3,448.00 to the recipients from the Juab 
County Welfare Department (Exhibit P-7, Tr. 44). As 
1 lo the matter of 6 % interest, it was not necessary 
1 for the court to refer to a regulation of the Utah State 
I Welfare Department. The statutes in effect at the 
l time the lien was executed, Utah Code Ann. § 
~ 55-2-5 (1953), as amended by Utah Laws 1953, ch. 90 
1 2, and at the time the complaint was filed, Utah 
Code Ann. § 55- l 5-30(2)c (1963), p r o v i d e d that 
it interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be charge-
, able beginning 90 days after the lien becomes due 
!. and payable when a. lump sum settlement of the 
r. lien is not paid. 
If the court should hold that the evidence is not 
1 
sufficient to show the payment of the amount al-
lowed in the judgment, then the matter should be 
. returned to the trial court for additional evidence 
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including evidence as to the payments made by the 
Utah County Department of Public Welfare in the 
amount of $807 .90 as alleged in the complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
An analysis of appellant's argument and author-
ities clearly shows there is no merit to his conten 
tions. The public welfare lien agreement is an 
agreement on which the six year statute of limitu· 
tion applies and comes under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-23(2) (1953). The Tuab County Department o! 
Public Welfare is the real party in interest in this 
matter and may recover funds in behalf of the state 
and federal governments. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
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